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A recent series of reports in the New England Journal of Medicinel- 3 have been 
interpreted as providing support for the use of fetal brain tissue transplantation as 
a treatment for Parkinson's disease." The publication of these studies also 
provided impetus for President Clinton to repeal the administrative ban on the 
use of federal funds for transplanting aborted human fetal tissue into patients. 
Although this decision may be viewed by some as the end to a long political battle 
between "pro-choice" and "pro-life" factions, such an assessment underestimates 
the depth of the issues involved. The questions that have been raised on many 
occasions regarding the ethical issues surrounding the use of tissue obtained from 
the intentionally-aborted human fetus remain largely unanswered.s-n The 
purpose of this article is to review such questions and to emphasize the unfinished 
nature of the debate. There are three major ethical questions relating specifically 
to the question of using fetal brain tissue for treating Parkinsons' disease: 1) When 
can such a treatment be justified on medical grounds?, 2) What are the criteria 
for defining fetal death? and 3) To what extent does the ethical status of abortion 
affect the use of research or therapy based on tissue derived from aborted fetuses? 
Is Fetal Brain Tissue Transplantation Medically Justified? 
The rationale for transplanting these neurons is that they will synthesize 
dopamine, thereby replacing the neurotransmitter that is lost in Parkinson's 
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disease. Two features of the transplant paradigm that weaken the rationale are 1) ~ 
the transplant is placed into a brain region where the tissue is not normally located 
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and 2) it is not possible to transplant only the cells of interest due to the inability to 
identify and isolate the dopamine-producing neurons in the midbrain at this age. 
As a result, interpreting the results obtained with such transplants is difficult since 
it is not clear what feature of the transplanted tissue might underlie the observed 
effects. In fact, the possibility has been raised that the effectiveness of the 
transplant may depend on the surgical procedure itself, not the tissue. Further 
support for this possibility is provided by the recent study from Yale in which the 
one patient who came to autopsy demonstrated no dopamine-B-hydroxylase 
activity in the transplant.3 Additional skepticism arises from the experience of 
using autologous grafts of adrenal medulla, which were initially reported to 
provide substantial benefitl2 but were later found not to be efficacious. 13,14 
The lack of strong evidence for a specific mechanism by which fetal transplants 
might be expected to work, as well as the questionable efficacy of the procedure, 
raise the first of many ethical questions regarding this procedure. Specifically, 
should Parkinson's patients be submitted to a costly and invasive procedure for 
which there is no compelling rationale? Even if the procedure is ultimately shown 
to be effective, its relative effectiveness must be established. In other words, can 
one obtain comparable results with less costly or less invasive therapy? In 
addition, the human studies that have been carried out so far do not include any 
controls for the transplant procedure. Therefore, the possibility of a placebo effect 
needs to be kept in mind. This is especially true in studies where patients rate their 
own status.2 
None of these questions relate to the issue of the source of the tissue (raised 
below) yet they require as much attention as the abortion-related questions do. 
One of the reasons that such issues get less attention is because the public is not in 
a position to assess the medical and scientific evidence. However: there is 
substantial disagreement within the medical and scientific community regarding 
the rationale and effectiveness of tissue transplants as a therapy for Parkinson's 
disease. IS Perhaps not surprisingly, the strongest proponents of the use of this 
procedure are those who are carrying out the work. This is all the more reason 
that dispassionate assessment is called for when evaluating the results of 
transplant studies. 
Defining Fetal Death 
It is important to recognize that the fetus, or the desired organ, must be living to 
serve as a useful tissue donor. However there is some disagreement about the 
term "living." The traditional biological definition includes the concepts of 
metabolism, growth, respiration, etc. Certainly, prior to the abortion, the fetus 
meets all these criteria. The suitability of fetal tissue for transplantation depends 
on the manner in which it is obtained. The ideal tissue is that obtained from an 
intact living fetus. However, with rare exceptions, current abortion procedures 
involve destruction of the fetus as an entity and corresponding destruction of the 
fetal body and its tissues. Due to extensive tissue fragmentation, it may take a long 
time to identify suitable viable tissue by quickly sifting through the remains 
reSUlting from suction abortion. This delay can compromise the usefulness of the 
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tissue. On the other hand, if the fetus is aborted relatively intact, it is much easier 
to obtain the desired tissue with minimal delay. Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether abortion procedures will be influenced by the demand for fresh intact 
fetal tissue as apparently was the case for initial studies in Sweden.16 Whenever 
researchers have a choice they prefer to use intact fetuses. One study assessed the 
viability of human brain tissue at various intervals after the abortion. 17 All of the 
fetuses were obtained through prostaglandin-induced abortion. In other words, 
the fetuses were delivered intact and, quite possibly, alive, depending on what 
criteria of death are accepted as standard. 
The most viable tissue for the purpose of transplantation is that obtained from 
fetuses between 8 and 12 weeks gestational age. This is a stage before the nerve 
cells in the midbrain have completed development and, therefore, retain their 
capacity to form connections with target tissue. This is also a period of 
development when the major brain and spinal cord architecture has been 
established and the fetus exhibits motor and sensory capabilities. Whether an 
8-week old fetus perceives pain is still debated but fetal response to noxious 
stimuli and the presence of neural pathways that are known to subserve pain in 
maturity strongly suggest that the fetus perceives some pain at this stage. This 
issue has only been addressed tangentially in the political and scientific discussion 
of the ethics surrounding the use of fetal tissue. Mahowald, et a~ 18 suggested that 
if there was concern that the aborted fetus might perceive pain as a result of 
acquiring tissue this could be dealt with by using appropriate anesthetics. The 
irony of this suggestion is highlighted by the fact that abortion of a fetus at any 
stage of development rarely involves anesthesia of the fetus since most abortions 
are carried out under local anesthesia. 19 The fetus is unanesthetized except in the 
relatively uncommon circumstance of general anesthesia provided to the mother. 
RegaPdless of the precise age at which nociception is established, there is little 
question that the fetal brain is more resistant to anoxia and ischemia than the 
postnatal brain.9 This, along with the fact that many of the nerve cells have not yet 
established connections with their targets, makes fetal tissue more suitable for 
transplantation and tissue cultural studies than mature brain tissue. However, this 
greater viability of the fetal brain, as compared with the mature brain, raises the 
question of whether existing criteria for determining fetal death are sufficient to 
prevent vivisection when harvesting tissue from the aborted fetus. There is no 
question that most abortion procedures result in circulatory arrest. In fact, no one 
can argue with the simple statement that "abortion stops a beating heart" 
although the heart may continue to beat for some time 'after the abortion is 
complete. However, the criterion of cessation of fetal circulation appears 
insufficient in light of the continued survival of brain tissue both following 
transplantation and in tissue culture.17 Furthermore, the possibility of using brain 
death as the criterion for determining fetal death directly contradicts the goal of 
harvesting the fetal brain in order to obtain viable tissue. Until we know more 
about fetal perception it seems the most conservative course of action would be to 
provide anesthesia for the fetus prior to the abortion procedure in order to 
prevent the possibility of pain perception during the abortion or subsequent 
harvesting of tissue. 
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Moral Relationship Between Abortion and the Use of Tissue 
From Aborted Fetuses 
Although it seems superfluous to review the semantics associated with using 
tissue from the intentionally-aborted human fetus, there remains a surprising 
level of ignorance on basic terms. The term human does not require further 
qualification because there is no scientific disagreement that from fertilization 
onward the organism is unquestionably human in the biological sense ofthe term 
(that is, of the human species). It is not bovine or feline or canine and, with 
increasingly sophisticated techniques, it can be demonstrated, from conception 
on, to constitute a unique human individual using genetic, biochemical or 
morphological criteria. Of course, the form each individual human organism 
assumes changes cOntinuously throughout its life albeit at less dramatic rates than 
when first developing. 
There is also no disagreement that the biological organism constituted by an 
individual zygote, embryo or fetus (each term representing different 
developmental stages) is unique in terms of its developmental potential. Such 
potential is contained within the genetic and cytoplasmic information of the 
organism that, if appropriately nourished, will develop into a more mature 
organism whose legal and moral status becomes universally accepted. Full 
protectable status is now granted at a relatively late stage, i.e., at birth. Although 
not the focus of this paper, it is of some interest that the latent legal doctrine on 
which the "right" to abortion depends is that the mother has absolute power over 
the fetus, that is, the fetus is completely dependent on the mother for survival (at 
least during the first 20 weeks of gestation). 
It is important to recall that the term abortion (Stedman's: 1. Giving birth to an 
embryo or fetus prior to the stage of viability at about 20 weeks of gestation.) is 
not equivalent to feticide. In fact, with some abortion procedures the living fetus 
is expulsed even though it has limited viability (able to survive independently). 
The AMA was well aware of this when passing resolutions condemning "the act 
of producing abortion at every period of gestation, except as necessary for 
preserving the life of either the mother or child." On the other hand it is possible, 
and usually the case, to insure fetal death by destroying the fetus prior to her 
removal. In fact, the gradual acceptance of vacuum aspiration as the method of 
choice for "terminating" early pregnancy is often defended on grounds that it is 
safer for the mother, but there is little question that another impetus for 
developing such methods was to hasten the death of the fetus. 
Thus, from a scientific point of view, the fetal donor is a living (or dying) 
developing human being. The fact that the tissue is human, as opposed to deriving 
from other species, increases the chance of success when using the tissue for 
transplantation because of the reduced chance of immunological rejection. 
Non-human animal tissue is simply inferior in this regard. The fact that the fetus is 
in a stage of rapid development is also advantageous because the developing 
nervous system undergoes a period of tremendous plasticity that can theoretically 
be used to advantage when transplanted into a damaged adult brain or spinal 
cord. As mentioned above, fetal tissue is also more resistant to injury and lack 
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of oxygen, permitting it to survive the surgical procedures much better than 
mature tissue. 
The fact that the tissue derived from the human fetus is genetically unique is 
only an advantage if attempts are made to match donor and recipient on 
immunological criteria. Such matching is commonplace for organ transplants 
between mature individuals in order to avoid rejection. The question of 
immunological rejection has not been answered regarding fetal tissue transplants. 
In one of the recent studies reported by Freed, et a~ 2 immunosuppressive therapy 
did not seem to affect patient outcome. If immunological rejection did turn out to 
be significant, this would create a problem for those who argue that the best way 
to dissociate the transplant procedure from the abortion procedure is to insure 
that donors and hosts cannot be specified. In fact, in the many guidelines that 
have been suggested by various committees regarding transplantation of fetal 
tissue, strict precaution is usually taken to insure that relatives cannot be 
recipients of the human fetal tissue. 1 1,20 This is precisely the opposite of the case 
when undertaking other types of transplantation where a related donor is much 
preferred over a non-related donor. 
Of course the other feature of developing human fetal tissue that makes it 
especially desirable for research and transplantation is its widespread availability 
and abundance. This is a direct consequence of the legality and practice of 
induced abortion. As a result, it is clear that the ongoing research and 
transplantation attempts depend on the continued availability of living, 
developing human tissue and therefore, on the continued practice of induced 
abortion. In this sense there is a direct relationship between the two procedures. 
Whether this dependence provides additional incentive or conciliation for 
women seeking abortion is debatable. There is no direct evidence bearing on this 
question with the exception that in one survey some women stated they would be 
willing to conceive and abort for the purpose of donating fetal tissue.21 Although 
the potential incentive for abortion provided the basis for the Reagan 
administration's ban on federal funding of fetal tissue transplantation, recently 
overturned by President Clinton, there are several more compelling arguments 
for not only preventing the use of federal tax dollars to support such work but also 
to ban experimentation on the aborted fetus. Much of the discussion on this issue 
has failed to take note of the fact that federal funds can be, and have been, used to 
support widespread research with human fetal tissue that does not involve 
transplantation into human patients. Furthermore, even the administrative ban 
on federal funding did not prevent the use of private funds for this work. The only 
current restrictions that exist are individual state laws regulating experimentation 
on the human fetus.22 
Returning to the relationship of fetal tissue research to the abortion practice 
that makes the tissue available, several points should be noted. One is the amount 
of the tissue needed for individual experiments. This has ranged from one2,3 to 
several 1 fetal donors per patient. The availability of tissue from fetuses of the 
desired developmental stage relies on the timing of abortions and access to the 
aborted fetuses in a timely manner. These difficulties can be overcome by using 
frozen tissue so that a tissue bank can be established to provide tissue as needed23. 
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In fact, this approach was taken by the group at Yale.3 Many ofthe proponents of 
fetal tissue use favor this approach because it permits greater spatial and temporal 
separation between the abortion and the use of the resulting tissue. Even so, 
someone has to take responsibility for dissecting the tissue as it becomes available 
to store for future use. The professional collaboration that must be established 
between the investigators who use the tissue and the individuals who acquire the 
tissue is evident from the fact that both types of individuals are listed as authors on 
publications describing the work.24,2s In one case, one investigator who 
collaborated on transplanting aborted fetal tissue also published his own 
technique of acquiring the fetal brain tissue prior to carrying out the abortion 
procedure. 16 
The problem of defining fetal death has already been addressed. A related issue 
is the question of consent in donating fetal tissue or organs. The precedent that has 
been established in other cases of tissue or organ donation is quite clear. Either the 
donor provides such consent on his or her own behalf or it is provided on behalf 
of the donor by someone who is considered qualified to represent and protect the 
donor's interest. In the case of infant organ donation, since the infant is never 
capable of providing such consent, the parents or guardians are usually the 
relevant proxies. The one clear exception to this is when the parent or guardian 
has directly or indirectly contributed to the demise of the donor. Thus, in the case 
of aborted fetuses it seems unlikely that the mother can be considered an 
appropriate proxy for the fetus that she has consented to abort.6 Nor can the 
abortionist be considered qualified to provide consent on behalf of the fetus he or 
she destroys. By the same token, the medical personnel who desire to use the 
tissue for research or transplantation should have no say in the decision for 
obvious reasons. In fact, it may be impossible to establish a consent procedure 
that is consistent with historical, ethically-sound practice. 
Some Personal Observations 
Every year I attend the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, a 
gathering of scientists from around the country who study the brain. Every year, 
scattered among the posters and talks describing new techniques and insights 
gained from work on animals, are increasing numbers of studies using the human 
fetus. This partly reflects the development of new methods but also stems from 
the fact that there are many fetal human subjects available. Prior to 1973, 
scientists had to rely on spontaneous abortions to obtain "material" while today 
large numbers of healthy fetuses, aborted at various stages of development, 
provide much greater opportunities for research. 
Wandering the rows of posters at the meeting, I am struck by the extent to 
which the human fetus has become just another experimental subject. In fact, 
there are fewer regulations guiding the experimental use of the human fetus than 
of most research animals. The philosophical and biological premise that humans 
are neither more nor less than other animals is common today. In fact, unborn 
humans aren't afforded the protection of "endangered" species or even of 
experimental animals. Those who object to experiments carried out on the 
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human fetus are usually less strident and violent in their opposition to human 
fetal experimentation than, for example, the Animal Liberation Front is in 
protesting the use of animals in research. 
For scientists probing the mysteries of early human brain development, this is 
truly a windfall and almost irresistable. Not only does our society permit, and 
often encourage, women to "terminate their pregnancies," but victims of 
neurological, or other, disease can now be recruited as allies to seek society'S 
approval for therapeutic use of the aborted. After all, the reasoning goes, if the 
tissue is going to be thrown away, why not let it be used to cure someone who has 
Parkinson's disease or Alzheimer's disease? Why let the tissue go to waste? Of 
course one obvious answer is that we should never permit such tissue to be 
generated in this way in the first place. Another less apparent answer is that we 
should treat fetal remains with the same respect we give to any other member of 
our society who has died by natural or unnatural cause. Rather than discard such 
remains in a trash bin, we should bury them with due respect. 
Many physicians and scientists have historically used a common theme to 
justify their experiments on those considered expendable. Note the plight of a 
transplant team in Mexico, where abortion is still illegal. They say they were 
"limited to the use of fetuses only from spontaneous abortions" but "encourage 
those neural transplantation groups in countries where elective abortions are 
legal, to take advantage of their social circumstance."26 In this country the social 
circumstances are more favorable and the new administration now sanctions all 
uses of the aborted fetus for medical research. 
Surprisingly, proponents of abortion on demand and of the experimental use 
of the aborted fetus claim that we can, and should, separate the practice of 
abortion from the experimental use of the unborn.8 It is objectionable, they say, 
for a woman to abort for the purpose of donating tissue. It is deplorable, they 
maintain, to think that any woman would sell her offspring for medical 
experimentation. But advocates have difficulty defending their position. If a 
woman has a fundamental right to abortion, why shouldn't she be able to provide 
tissue for a relative or even sell to the highest bidder to generate income for her 
other dependents? The scientists who study the tissue, the physicians who 
transplant it and the patients who receive it, hope to benefit. Why not the mother? 
Perhaps attempts to insulate the act of abortion from the use of the aborted 
reflect a tacit admission that we have slid about as far down the slippery slope as 
we can. It is said that the most telling attribute of a civilized society is the 
protection it affords its most vulnerable members. Issues of concern to women 
appeal to our legitimate desire to protect those women who have been exploited 
by the biological fact that they are the only ones who get pregnant. It is no 
surprise that many men support the "pro-choice" philosophy and the 
corresponding reduction in sexual accountability. That mothers accept the death 
of their offspring as a solution to their own vulnerability is harder to fathom 
unless they are desperate. But many are also unaware of the true nature of the life 
growing inside. Physicians and scientists could playa critical role in educating 
them about the lives involved. There is no question that we need to take a hard 
look at the issues surrounding "unwanted" pregnancies but still reject solutions 
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What is it about the human fetus that attracts scientists to "utilize" her? No 
surprise. She is a living, developing, human being, as genetically and 
anatomically distinct from her mother as she is from her father. By studying her 
we study ourselves. If not "terminated", she will continue to develop, requiring 
nurture and protection for many years after the direct physical link with the 
mother is broken. But she is different from postnatal beings in a significant way. 
For the first nine months she is hidden from view. Displaying her secret life of 
kicking, sucking, jumping and responding to pain, requires modern technology. 
When confronted with the evidence many women change their mind. But for 
others the "solution" of abortion is too tempting to forego. Besides, educating the 
public on these issues would cut into the many "benefits" of abortion such as 
popUlation control, income for abortionists and experimental subjects for 
scientists. Any discomfort that arises when confronting the aborted body parts is 
tempered by rationalizing that autonomous rights of women outweigh any 
conceivable rights of unborn "obligate parasites" or "non-viable" fetuses. 
Ironically, the unborn are regaining status in our society. But only in the sense 
that they are more valuable dead than alive. So the lucrative clinics stay open and 
we solve our "problems" with technical skills refined for other purposes. And 
now, there is the promise that we can reap additional benefits from their demise. 
In the meantime, scientists gather together every year and compare notes, taking 
advantage of their social situation. In fact, prominent scientist leaders defend this 
practice. In a recent editorial" in -Science magaiinep -Ur. Koshland called for 
"professionalism ... without emotionalism" regarding the question of federal 
funding of fetal tissue transplantation research. He then provided arguments in 
support of such research while characterizing those who object to it as playing a 
"game of politics". He ignores scientific and ethical arguments raised against the 
use of aborted fetuses for medical experimentation. He did not refer to significant 
debate within the medical community, apart from the question of abortion, as to 
whether or not fetal tissue transplantation really "is of enormous value and can be 
used in actual therapy for certain illnesses like Parkinson's disease." Furthermore, 
he suggested that "fetal tissue should be placed in the same category as research 
on cadavers" without recognizing that there are valid medical questions 
regarding the definition of fetal death as I have alluded to earlier. 
More troubling is Koshland's insistence that science has no role in the wider 
societal debate on abortion since "a death is preordained outside the research 
world." This view is highly reminiscent of the defense offered by Nazi scientists 
and physicians, such as Dr. Hallervorden, at the Nuremburg trials. If, as Dr. 
Koshland asserts, taking a stand against the use of tissue derived from elective 
abortion is "illogical" then the worldwide condemnation of many of the scientists 
and physicians in Nazi Germany, such as Dr. Hallervorden, is also illogical. The 
Nazi scientists argued, as does Dr. Koshland in support of fetal tissue, that they 
were "making the best of the consequences of a previous history". After all, 
"death was preordained outside the research world." They would also surely 
ha ve agreed with Dr. Koshland that "the use of those materials should be termed 
as unrelated to the political issues." 
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Perhaps Dr. Koshland could defend his own position, while at the same time 
condemning Nazi scientists, by adopting the view that feticide is fundamentally 
different from the genocide practiced by the Nazis because the human fetus is not 
worth protecting. If so, one must wonder why he states in the same editorial that 
one of the goals of fetal tissue research is to treat "disease conditions in fetuses." 
How is it that a human fetus can be considered a patient in one context and just a 
source of tissue in another context? The answer is that in both cases the fetus is 
considered valuable, but in the latter situation he or she is perceived as a 
contributor to society, rather than a member, and more valuable dead than alive. 
It is precisely this view of the fetus as a commodity that drives much of the 
opposition to federal funding of research that depends on elective abortion. 
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